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Fighting to Leave or to Stay?
Migrant Workers, Redundancy and Assisted Return Programs 
During the Talbot Dispute, 1983-1984
*
Vincent Gay**
In the late nineteen seventies and early eighties, the restructuring of the French 
automobile industry caused a significant reduction in the number of unskilled 
jobs. When the Board of directors of the Talbot factory in Poissy near Paris 
announced its redundancy plan in 1983, a one-month strike was launched to 
defend the work site and oppose the dismissals. But as the demands remained 
unanswered, some of the unskilled migrant workers, the first to be threatened 
by the redundancies, called for financial assistance to return to their home 
countries. Arising in the middle of the conflict, the new demand forced the 
strikers to reconsider their positions. Though union activists were uncom-
fortable with the demand, which they viewed as a renunciation to fight for 
employment, they ended up accepting it. As to the French government, it saw 
it as an opportunity, creating a new system to encourage migrant workers to 
go back to their countries of origin.
“How should the Talbot events be remembered? […] By robots trying to ship immigrants back to their villages?”1 These few words, extracted from a labour 
union brochure on the Talbot dispute in 1983-1984, contain in a nutshell the issues 
this article wishes to present.
In the 1970s, after a long period of growth that in some factories had been made 
possible by the massive use of migrant workers in the toughest and least well paid jobs 
(PITTI, 2002), the French automobile industry entered a crisis and had to be thoroughly 
restructured; what then was to become of the least qualified segment of the worker 
population confronted by the transformations of the work universe, and particularly 
the unskilled immigrant labourers?
1. « L’effet Talbot ou les raisons profondes d’un conflit », 1984, Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
* Translation: Gabrielle Varro.  
Article published in French in Travail et Emploi, n° 137, janvier-mars 2014.
** Université d’Évry-Val-d’Essonne, Institutions et dynamiques historiques de l’économie et de la société (IDHES); 
gayvincent@wanadoo.fr 
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At the start of the 1980s, the PSA (Peugeot) group was particularly affected 
by the restructurings, and first of all in its Talbot plant in Poissy (Greater Paris 
region), where management was seeking to part with some of its unskilled labourers. 
Following the announcement by PSA that there would be 2,905 redundancies, between 
December 1983 and January 1984 a month-long strike shook the factory. It was to be 
an important test for all the actors involved –workers and union activists, as well as 
management and the French government.
In order to study the redundancies and the strike they triggered, they must first be 
replaced in the broader industrial, social and political environment, and in that specific 
factory’s history and context. Without going into an exhaustive analysis of the dispute, 
we wish to shed some light on the stakes by taking off from one single fact: though the 
strike was launched to defend employment and fight redundancies, after two weeks 
a new demand came to the fore: financial assistance to permit immigrant workers to 
return to their native countries.
The demand was not voiced by the unions but by a group of striking migrant 
workers, which obliged the unions and the government to readjust their respective 
strategies. More than simply a demand, it can be considered as an event in the sense 
that it produced effects and displacements (BENSA, FASSIN, 2002), and must be analysed 
as much for what it produced as for what it said about the situation of migrant workers 
and how they perceived their own futures. In fact, inasmuch as it concerned a particular 
fraction of the worker population, the demand partly reshuffled what was at stake in 
the dispute, the positions of the various actors, and how to respond to the dismissals. 
What was at stake was as much a problem specific to the world of work –is there still 
space in a changing automobile industry for unskilled labourers?– as it was a problem 
involving the State and its policies regarding foreigners, since the lay-offs and assisted 
return programs challenged the very legitimacy of their presence in France.
After outlining the economic, industrial and social context of PSA and its Talbot 
plant, we will therefore study the impact of the demand for assisted return programs 
on the different actors. We will first consider the ways the strikers themselves viewed 
the demand: what did it communicate of their apprehension over their professional 
futures, their future in France, the social and economic realities confronting them? 
How did a demand that seemed to turn its back on the fight for jobs in fact mistreat 
and defy the unions? Lastly, we will see how this event represented a windfall for the 
French government, tempted to view voluntary return assistance as an effective way 
to avoid making hundreds of workers redundant.
Our study will concentrate mainly on the reactions of strikers, union members 
and government representatives or consultants, but an exhaustive study would also 
require taking other protagonists into account: non-striking employees, the embassies 
of immigrant workers’ home countries (in particular the Moroccan Embassy), the 
media, migrant associations, State administrations, and of course, PSA and Talbot 
CEOs.
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This article has drawn on archives of different sorts: labour union sources derived 
from the minutes of inside meetings, sources from Company Workers’ Committees, or 
activist material from the labour organizations, as well as documents from the cabinets 
of various ministries.2 Interviews carried out with participants in the dispute −former 
Talbot employees and union activists, as well as with a former consultant to the Prime 
Minister– round out our written sources.
Talbot-Poissy: a Plant Characterised by Immigration 
and Independent Unionism
Though marked by a long chain of emergencies like the rest of the automobile 
industry, given the make-up of its workforce, the crisis in the Talbot plant in Poissy 
unfolded in a very particular way; similarly, the forms taken by the 1983-1984 dispute 
can only be comprehended if replaced in the plant’s social and labour-union history.
A report on the training of unskilled labourers at Talbot in 1983 contains a 
precise sociological description of the plant:3 of the 16,000 employees, 13,500 were 
workers, approximately 10,800 of them unskilled labourers (O.S.), the O.S. category 
representing 42.2% of French automobile wage-earners all told. At Talbot, they were 
mainly appointed to the assembly shop (the case of 39% of workers overall), metal 
stamping and body assembly (18%), and mechanics (8%). Foreigners made up 52.3% 
of the worker population (vs. 27.5% for the entire PSA group and 25.8% for the 
Renault group). The number of nationalities among foreign workers was considerable: 
Moroccans came first (4,402 or 58% of the foreign population), followed by Algerians 
(792 or 10%), Turks (5%), Senegalese (4.5%), Spanish (4%), Portuguese (4%) and 
Sub-Saharan Africans. Among the workers, 16.5% were under 30; 42.1% were aged 
30 to 39; 28.8% 40 to 49 and 12.6% were over 50. In the Talbot factory, 87.6% of the 
foreign workers had never finished grade school, 8.7% had a grade school education 
(vs. 37.5% for French workers), and 3.7% had gone to high-school (62.4% for the 
French). Job classifications reflected the same discrepancies: while the coefficient4 
for 96% of the Moroccan population fell between 160 and 190, the coefficient for 
86% of French workers lay between 180 and 255. The bulk of workers in Poissy were 
male (only 4% female) and little-skilled; as a result of the hiring policy applied since 
the early 1960s, the number of foreigners there was twice that of the entire French 
2. Minister cabinet archives can be found at the Centre des archives contemporaines (CAC) in Pierrefitte, at the Centre 
des archives diplomatiques in Nantes, or in the collections assembled by Patrick Weil at “Sciences Po” (Fondation 
nationale de sciences politiques, FNSP/WE).
3. Travail et formation des ouvriers de fabrication de l’industrie automobile, Report of the Commission for the 
development of professional training for unskilled labourers, 7 January-12 October 1983, CAC, deposit 19960442, 
article 15, role 3.
4. The coefficients define the place each employee occupies in the classification grids of the companies and conse-
quently determine their remuneration.
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automobile sector. Three-quarters of them (73%) had worked at Talbot for over ten 
years. The assembly line or the hardest jobs were their common lot. That situation was 
reinforced by the fact that in-house training was aimed at skilled and highly skilled 
workers. As a result, most of the foreign workers, many of whom were illiterate both 
in French and in their mother tongue, were excluded from training. Management, the 
government, and even the authors of the report on the training of unskilled labourers 
depict migrant workers as an aging group unable to adapt to the changes at hand; yet, 
a very large majority of unskilled workers were under 50. That widespread represen-
tation was to weigh on the way their future was envisioned, both inside and outside 
the firm. Their social relations also revealed specific features. The Poissy factory was 
in fact a stronghold of independent unionism since the 1950s: the French Labour 
Confederation (Confédération française du travail – CFT) −that changed its name to 
Confederation of Independent Unions (Confédération des syndicats libres – CSL) in 
1977 (LOUBET, HATZFELD, 2002)− was both a tool in the struggle against the supposedly 
revolutionary unions −personified by the CGT and the CFDT−5 and an instrument for 
forcibly integrating employees, particularly migrant workers. For those who accepted, 
belonging to the CSL meant staying clear of problems, being well considered by their 
supervisors, it even meant certain benefits. Even in May 1968, the factory managed to 
keep clear of social conflicts. It did not, however, escape the cycle of disputes in the 
automobile sector that began in September 1981. All the car manufacturers and many 
plants, both in the Paris region and in the provinces, were impacted by strikes and 
walkouts of variable lengths (RICHTER, LAURET, 1983). Though in Renault and Peugeot 
plants workers’ demands bore mainly on salaries, classifications or the organization 
of labour, in the Citroën factories and at Talbot, in the Spring of 1982, strikers were 
also demanding greater freedom and respect. A four week-long strike broke out in 
June 1982 against the control exercised by the CSL and the practices of management, 
that not only disrupted the managerial order but also ended up with unskilled migrant 
labourers massively joining the unions, mostly the CGT but also, though to a lesser 
extent, the CFDT. Assembly line delegates were chosen among them: 220 from the 
CGT and ca. 60 from the CFDT. For one year, the factory became the hub of a latent 
and quasi permanent conflict, especially against the tyranny of self-appointed, petty 
bosses (LOUBET, HATZFELD, 2001; GAY, 2011).6 The power struggle was transparent in 
the vote, since between the elections preceding the strike in May 1982 and those that 
followed in 1983, in the first (i.e. workers’) electoral college the CSL dropped from 
50.7 to 34.7% while the CGT rose from 29.3 to 42.3%, and the CFDT from 5.3 to 8.2%, 
the Confédération autonome du travail (CAT) from 6.5 to 8.1%, and Force Ouvrière 
(FO) obtained 3.7%.7 However, in 1983, as the threat to employment intensified, the 
very significance of employees’ behaviour was modified.
5. CGT: Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour). CFDT: Confédération française 
démocratique du travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labour).
6. A similar movement for similar causes took place a few weeks earlier in the Citroën factory at Aulnay-sous-Bois.
7. Nevertheless, overall the CSL remained the majority, with 38.7%, vs. 36% for the CGT and 8.9% for the CFDT.
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A Sword of Damocles Over Employment 
and Over the Factory
Between the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979 −the symbolic beginnings of a 
worldwide economic crisis− and up to the 1980s, the automobile industry underwent 
considerable transformations from the point of view of buy-ups and mergers as well 
as from the point of view of the number of factory sites and employees, or from the 
point of view of the organization of labour (LOUBET, 2001). Those years signaled the 
end of massive hiring and opened the way to large scale sub-contracting and temporary 
employment (BOUQUIN, 2006; GORGEU, MATHIEU, 2005). The PSA group was the 
first to be concerned by these upheavals, since in a short time, after having bought 
up first Citroën, then Chrysler-Europe (formerly Simca), it went from being a fair-
sized industrial group to being the first European corporation in the sector. But those 
operations did not take place at the best of times. Since the end of the 1960s, Citroën, 
whose sales had collapsed, faced huge difficulties, prompting the fear that it might 
be bought up by a foreign company or generating the specter of State intervention. 
Though the situation improved during the second half of the 1970s, harmonising 
Peugeot and Citroën was expensive and required cutting costs on both sides. As to 
Chrysler-Europe, its acquisition had also been prompted by the fear it might be bought 
up by a foreign manufacturer. But the resulting industrial group boasted more than 30 
factories, 220,000 employees and produced 26 models (LOUBET, 1994): it thus became 
even more urgent to achieve economies of scale and coordinate the various activities. 
Henceforth, downsizing −the number of employees varied according to the worksite− 
was considered timely, and different systems implemented it: employment stopped, 
workers who retired were not replaced, companies lent each other employees, made 
considerable use of temporary unemployment and encouraged voluntary departures, 
pre-retirement, and the return to their native countries of migrant workers.
The early 1980s were characterised by a collapse of production and problems of 
productivity that made PSA less competitive. At the Talbot plant, the drop in production 
was more radical than in the rest of the group; it plumetted by 30% between 1979 
and 1980, with 31 days not worked that year (59 in 1981). Despite a slight recovery in 
1982, the beginning of 1983 again showed disturbing signs (25 days not worked during 
the first semester). In the face of these difficulties, PSA management sought to adapt 
to a market that had slowed down, first of all by cutting production costs, which also 
meant cutting salaries. Brandished by Jacques Calvet, president and general manager 
of PSA (LOUBET, HATZFELD, 2001), the threat that Talbot would be shut down was taken 
seriously by the government8 and by the CGT. On July 12 1983, a massive redundancy 
plan was announced: Talbot was scheduled to lose 4,140 jobs.9
8. Interview with René Cessieux, technical advisor to the Prime Minister 1981-1984, in April 2013.
9. « Emploi : les grosses charrettes de Talbot-Peugeot-Citroën », Libération, 13 July 1983.
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Though several automobile factories had been or would soon be concerned by 
drastic cuts in personnel, the impact of the redundancy plans differed according to the 
social and labour union history and sociological characteristics of each firm. In the 
Talbot-Poissy factory, several problems came to a head at the same time: industrial 
reform, a commercial crisis marked by a drop in production and the beginning of auto-
mation. What is more, for various observers, the profile of the employees concerned by 
overstaffing confirmed the idea they were not adapted to the changes taking place in 
the system of production. That raised the question of how to deal with the social side of 
redundancies by taking the social characteristics of the targeted workers into account.
Following the decision by PSA, the analyses and orientations of the two leading 
labour unions that would oppose the lay-offs −the CGT and the CFDT− diverged. 
The CFDT wanted to raise the issue of the future of the entire automobile sector, 
considering it was on that level that alternatives to the destruction of jobs could be 
found. In particular, it endorsed the idea of reducing working time, bringing it down to 
the European level in conjunction with the German unions’ ongoing campaign on the 
same theme. It also pleaded for a policy of reclassifications on the local employment 
markets. It expressed doubts on PSA’s economic evaluations, but did not necessarily 
question the notion of overstaffing.10 The fight against dismissals in Poissy was thus 
conceived by the CFDT within the larger framework of a campaign to reduce working 
time.11 The CGT insisted much more on the need to save Talbot, which PSA was 
threatening to shut down. Though it did not discard the question of reducing working 
time, the CGT demanded above all that the brand be maintained, that production (of 
the current as well as new models) be stepped up, that the commercial networks be 
reorganized, new investments made and professional training developed to permit 
workers to adapt to the changing world of work.12 The CGT wanted to both enhance 
Poissy’s strong points and denounce PSA’s industrial strategy, which they claimed was 
ruining Talbot since 1978.13 Beyond its demands, CGT discourse revealed a real fear 
the factory might shut down, a fear shared by a part of the wage-earners and that was 
to weigh on the interpretation of events to come.
Striking for Jobs, for the Industry, 
or for the Future of Migrant Workers?
Beginning in July 1983, several sequences followed upon one another or over-
lapped. Between the moment the redundancies were announced in July and the month 
of December, the company’s redeployment plan and proposals became more precise 
10. « Déclaration de la CFDT au CCE du 9 septembre 1983 », Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
11. CFDT-Talbot tract, 3 January 1984, Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
12. « Talbot vivra à Poissy », CGT-Talbot 4-page tract, June 1983, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
13. « Déclaration de la CGT au CCE du 9 septembre 1983 », Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
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and a strike got under way during which the demand for financial assistance for migrant 
workers to return to their native countries surfaced.
During the Company Workers’ Committee on 21 July 1983, management 
explained in detail how the redundancies were to take place: 1,235 people would 
be urged to leave on pre-retirement with the help of the National Employment Fund 
(Fonds national pour l’emploi – FNE) and 2,905 dismissals concerned exclusively 
production agents. After the rejection of the first version of its plan, PSA repeated its 
demand for redundancies on 21 November, accompanied by new proposals, among 
which the guarantee that Poissy would be spared. The idea of “making it easier for 
the personnel who volunteered to return to and reintegrate in their country of origin”14 
figured in the plan presented by management in July and was still there in September. 
However, the suggestions concerning the immigrant workers were limited to the 
agenda of the French-Algerian agreement of 1980,15 and to the possibility of taking 
a leave without pay, though certain schemes with the French National Immigration 
Office (Office national d’immigration – ONI) were not excluded.16
Between July and December, employees were in a state of wait-and-see, hanging 
on decisions made outside the factory which largely escaped the rank and file delegates, 
i.e. the backbone of a labour organization. On 24 November, there was a four-hour 
walk-out, and the CGT called for government intervention, stressing the fact that all the 
categories of personnel were concerned “from the unskilled labourer to the engineer”,17 
mentioning the interrogations expressed by professionals as well as technicians, and 
appealing to customers to come join the workers. In the face of the danger threatening 
the Poissy plant, the CGT sought to have all the wage-earners rally around the defense 
of employment, choosing to overlook the reality of the categories actually targeted by 
the dismissals. When the decision of 2,905 redundancies was upheld, first the CGT, 
then the CFDT, proposed a renewable strike until 7 December.
A Strike and 1,905 Lay-offs
Contrary to the 1982 dispute, when violent clashes marked the beginning of the 
strike, this time it started calmly, and in B3 −the parts assembly workshop which had 
already been an essential cog in 1982− production rapidly came to a halt. The lack of 
unity between the labour organizations was already crystal clear, and the CGT and 
CFDT watchwords were relatively different, but that did not dampen the enthusiasm 
14. « Plan social présenté au CCE du 21 juillet 1983 », Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
15. The exchange of letters between France and Algeria on 18 September 1980 concerning the return of Algerian 
workers and their families to Algeria, concluded an agreement that ran until 31 December 1983 and included a section 
on financial assistance for the return and for occupational training.
16. « Intervention de M. Collaine, président du CCE », before the Workers’ Committee on 9 September 1983, Archives 
URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
17. « Pour assurer votre emploi et avec un salaire décent, débrayez massivement le jeudi 24 novembre », CGT-Talbot 
tract, 24 November 1983, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
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of the occupation. The ideas of the minority organization, the CFDT,18 i.e. that it was 
necessary to demonstrate outside the factory or to elect workshop committees to control 
and organize the fight, were not very popular;19 the CGT filled most of the space.
7 to 17 December was the first phase of the strike. Simultaneously, the French gov-
ernment, represented by Pierre Bérégovoy, Minister of Social Affairs and Jack Ralite, 
Minister-delegate in charge of Employment, received Jacques Calvet on 14 December, 
followed by the CGT. The latter expressed a certain degree of satisfaction after the 
meeting; the government had been reassuring on the question uppermost in CGT 
rhetoric: preserving Talbot. The agreement that the future vehicle C28 would be built 
at the Poissy plant seemed to herald the possibility of negotiations on “the reduction of 
working time, earlier retirement for workers on the assembly line, training programs, 
and recycling”.20 The question of dismissals was not at the top of the CGT’s agenda, 
whereas the CFDT’s slogan was “zero redundancies”.21 Aside from disagreeing on 
demands, the two unions did not see eye to eye on the form the employees’ struggle 
should take. In fact, the CFDT did not like the way the strike had been conducted from 
the start because, according to them, the methods used were inherited from those applied 
during CFT-CSL domination, a period marked by “a strong tendency to delegate”22 
that prevents strikers from having their word to say about how a conflict should evolve.
17 December was the first turning-point. Negotiations between PSA and the gov-
ernment led to an agreement bringing the number of dismissals down from 2,905 to 
1,905 and procuring a certain number of guarantees to those laid off: any company 
hiring a person dismissed by Talbot would receive 20,000 francs, each person laid off 
could get a F20,000 rebate on the purchase of a Peugeot vehicle in case he/she created 
a business; a training program would be set up for 100 employees inside and 1,300 
employees outside the company, and their salary would be maintained during nine to 
twelve months; also, 500 reclassifications were scheduled. The CFDT Metal-Workers 
Federation acknowledged this as a first step (but on the worksite the union called for 
the strike to continue to protest the 1,905 dismissals remaining.)23 The CGT’s opinion 
was even more positive: 
“solutions have been found today that will allow workers to avoid unemployment 
[…]. Of the 2,905 redundancies first announced, the number has fallen by 1,000. 
18. The CFDT-Talbot section was also manned by activists who were against the Confederal guidelines led by 
Edmond Maire, whom they considered too conciliating vis-à-vis the Socialist government; however, the support 
of the Confederation to the section during the dispute created a distance between the Socialist Party and the CFDT.
19. « L’effet Talbot ou les raisons profondes d’un conflit », doc. cited.
20. « Courrier fédéral no 767, 23 Décembre 1983, spécial Talbot, Fédération de la Métallurgie CGT », Archives 
URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568. The CGT therefore did not rule out that Talbot employees might find work in another 
factory, thanks to training that Talbot could provide.
21. « Les travailleurs le crient : non aux licenciements », CFDT-Talbot tract, 21 December 1983, Archives interfé-
dérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
22. « Contre PSA, nous voulons peser sur les décisions gouvernementales », interview with J.-P. Noual, secretary of 
the CFDT section, Rouge, 16 December 1983.
23. « Nous sommes sur la bonne voie… accentuons notre pression ! », CFDT-Talbot tract, 18 December 1983, Archives 
interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
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For the remaining 1,905, negotiations must get under way in the next few hours, in 
particular concerning long-term training periods and reclassifications with long-term 
contracts. What we have gained is that no Talbot worker will have to register with 
the ANPE [Unemployment Bureau], no Talbot worker will be out of work. It is a 
significant advance”.24
CGT-Talbot thus called for negotiations to get under way with the factory management. 
When telling employees they should take into account the new situation made possible 
by the PSA-government agreement, the CGT did not mention any renewal of the strike.25
Though the difference between the positions of the two unions does not always 
seem very important, the consequences for each were considerable and the more or 
less latent divergencies between them sharpened. Two visions of the restructurings and 
the management of overstaffing at Talbot co-existed. The CGT’s fear the firm would 
file for bankruptcy affected its evaluation of the PSA-government agreement: they 
especially wanted to attenuate the consequences and propose viable solutions to the 
employees, including outside the company. But in the factory, the potential victims of 
the redundancies (see Box below), had little hope for an occupational future away from 
Talbot. Deindustrialisation and the rise of unemployment offered slim perspectives for 
migrant workers with few qualifications who were sometimes illiterate and showed 
they were afraid of the future and attached to the firm.26 Given their impossibility to 
24. Press conference of the Metalworkers Federation and CGT-Talbot union, 18 December 1983, Archives URIF-CGT, 
deposit 49J568.
25. « Pour une juste appréciation », CGT-Talbot-Poissy tract, 19 December 1983, Archives syndicat CGT PSA Poissy.
26. That aspect had already been noted in the report Travail et formation des ouvriers de fabrication de l’industrie 
automobile, doc. cited
BOX
Who are Those Made Redundant?
64% of those made redundant are production agents. The rest are warehousemen, 
workers in miscellaneous fields, painters, controllers, restaurant personnel, etc. 20% are 
French (of whom a majority comes from the overseas territories), 40% are Moroccan, 11% 
Senegalese, 7% Algerian.1 Besides, the criteria for dismissal seem arbitrary and do not 
correspond to the administration’s; those concerned are workers on leave due to illness or 
accident, or handicapped, or over 50.2 Also among those made redundant are 50 assembly 
line delegates who are members of the CGT and 15 who belong to the CFDT.3
1. « Courrier de l’adjoint au directeur de l’ANPE au président du FAS », 9 January 1984, archives FNSP/WE/32. 
The Fonds d’action sociale (FAS), originally intended for Muslim workers from Algeria and their families in met-
ropolitan France, was created in 1958 during the Constantine Plan. Originally charged with doing social work with 
Algerian migrants during the Algerian War –it financed e.g. the first Sonacotra establishments [workers’ shelters]– it 
then extended its prerogatives to all migrants. It was replaced by the National Agency for Social Cohesion and 
Equal Opportunity (Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances – Acsé) created in 2006.
2. « L’effet Talbot... », doc. cited
3. RICHTER R. (1984), « Entre fracture et recomposition du champ social », Alternative syndicale, 2, February.
Vincent Gay
16  – Travail et Emploi – 2015 Special Edition
project themselves into an occupational future, government as well as union rhetoric 
regarding training and professional conversion seemed totally incongruous.
Return Assistance and the Shift in the Stakes of the Dispute
A second turning-point, though relatively minor in both unions’ respective chro-
nologies of events, partly displaced the stakes of the dispute. On December 23rd, four 
migrant workers who were also CGT delegates organized a press conference, during 
which, given the deadlock, they demanded a 204,000 francs bonus to return to their 
native countries;27 the sum was an estimate of the cost of severance for a migrant 
worker, i.e. F80,000 for one year of training (salary + cost of training), F61,000 of 
unemployment benefits for one year at the end of the training period, F45,000 of 
family allowances for 30 months and F18,000 of lodging assistance. After the first 
rift following the 17 December agreement, and some people’s incomprehension of 
CGT strategy, this press conference looked like a second split, and revealed the social, 
national or political differentiations both at the heart of the group of workers and 
within the labour union. Assembly line delegates on the one hand, and union activists 
participating in the negotiations outside the factory on the other, did not relate to the 
redundancies and to the conflict in the same way. Besides, CGT rhetoric sought to 
create a consensus and bring everyone, from the unskilled labourer to the engineer, 
together. In the eyes of some workers, on the contrary, that rhetoric was smothering 
the specific discourse they felt they alone could represent and that cannot be reduced 
to, nor dissolved in, a group of employees that does not care about the differences or 
the fracture. Their rhetoric therefore repeated that it was “up to immigrants to expose 
immigrants’ problems in the media”,28 and it was as immigrants that they wanted to 
be heard. They were not addressing the firms but all of France, a country that, after 
having become rich thanks to them owed them a “dignified reintegration” in their home 
countries.29 But whereas dignity, a central theme in 1982, had meant equal treatment 
on a par with all workers in France, the meaning shifted, dignity now being used in 
view of guaranteeing a future outside the factory and outside France.
It was not the first time that voluntary return assistance was mentioned since the 
beginning of the strike. The theme had cropped up on previous days in statements 
reported by journalists,30 as well as in the Employment Minister’s declarations,31 or 
even the CGT’s.32 What was unprecedented was the fact it was being expressed in 
public, in the thick of the battle, by an unauthorised voice, disconnected from the 
union system, and with return assistance as the sole demand, detached from any idea 
27. See the hand-written account of the press conference on December 23, 1983, Centre des archives diplomatiques 
de Nantes, deposit 558PO/1/322.
28. « Talbot : “La génération usée” demande son compte », Libération, 26 December 1983.
29. Written account of the press conference, doc. cited
30. « Talbot-Poissy, la nuit la plus longue », Libération, 19 December 1983.
31. « Talbot : Ralite prêt à aider les licenciés qui souhaitent réémigrer », Libération, 22 December 1983.
32. « Talbot, discutez avec nous », L’Humanité, 20 December 1983.
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of training or reclassification. True, it was but a latent element, but appearing as it did 
during a press conference, it had considerable impact and partly reshaped the conflict. 
The fact that a voice the immigrants claimed represented them had found a way to 
make itself heard blurred the contours of the group implicated in the dispute: union 
activists, who speak for all workers, were no longer the only ones to speak publicly, 
since a part of the group, who did not define themselves exclusively by their position 
on the work site, was now speaking up. That profane discourse showed that different 
interests were at stake which, if not antagonistic, cut across the worker population and 
went against the mandatory class solidarity which was the union’s line of attack. Such a 
stance therefore partly displaced what was at stake in the dispute. It forced the various 
protagonists to take a stand, brought actors on the scene who until then had remained 
exterior, and even brought in new ones. The group known as the “CGT dissidents” 
caught the attention of a certain number of journalists, politicians and union activists.
What claimed to represent the immigrant worker’s way of thinking nevertheless 
contained a certain number of contradictions: for, though demanding return assistance 
might be interpreted as abandoning the fight for jobs –even as abandoning the fight 
altogether– it actually became one of the reasons to continue the fight, but in terms 
other than the ones propounded by the unions –preserving the firm for the CGT, zero 
redundancies for the CFDT. The dissidence also went further than a simple grudge 
against the CGT; it meant distancing themselves from union logics, apparently inca-
pable of taking the social destiny of immigrant workers into account, contrary to what 
had been the case in 1982 when the interests of union activists and unskilled migrant 
labourers, though in some ways different, still had managed to converge.
When deciding to prolong the strike, relations with this group of migrant workers 
therefore became a union issue; as to the government and the firm, they looked for 
new interlocutors among the workers who might be able to represent those mainly 
concerned by the dismissals; and the issue of return assistance was potentially a way 
to open negotiations in view of the departure of part of the immigrant population in 
French industry.
Fluctuating Labour Union Strategies
The significance of immigrant workers’ speaking out publicly is greater than the 
sole demand for return assistance. It must be considered in the more general context 
both of the conflict and of the Poissy plant, of the ways migrant workers became 
actively involved, of union practices and forms of management. What the immigrants 
declared at the time of the conflict and during the subsequent weeks questioned the 
unions’ approach to the fight against redundancy as well as the way they dealt with the 
issue of immigration. The unauthorised immigrant voice became a matter of concern 
for the unions because it represented a group that each organization wanted to win 
over to itself.
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Dissidence as a Union Issue
After the press conference of the “CGT dissidents” the taut relations, especially 
between CGT and CFDT, were more and more conspicuous. Though on the work site 
the former still claimed to be refusing the 1,905 dismissals, its position as to continuing 
the strike was ambivalent, whereas, by calling for the occupation to continue, the CFDT 
seemed to meet the approval of a good number of unskilled labourers. Also, on several 
occasions the newspapers wrote that the CFDT was in the process of outdoing the 
CGT,33 which only aggravated their mutual competition and finger pointing. An attempt 
by plant management to have the cleaning personnel reconquer the occupied building 
failed, spurring bouts of violence, and followed by the workers being expelled from the 
factory by the CRS [storm-trooper police] on 31 December. For the government and 
Talbot managers, if not for certain union activists, the conflict seemed to have come to 
an end: as of 1st January, the factory was cleaned and repainted. Yet on 3 January, the B3 
unit was reoccupied at the behest of the CFDT, even if the number of strikers rapidly 
dwindled to approximately 200.34 Over the next two days, extremely violent fighting 
broke out in the factory: those occupying had to ward off rabid groups of employees 
led by the CSL, and there were many wounded. When they tried to exit, strikers were 
greeted by racist slogans and the Marseillaise.35 On that day, anti-strikers and the CSL 
were seconded by extreme right-wing activists of the Parti des forces nouvelles36 who 
claimed they had “come to help activists of CSL-Poissy and the whole Peugeot group 
from Sochaux, Aulnay, Nanterre, Rennes, Paris, etc. clean up and clean out the Poissy 
plant”.37 There was such violence that CGT and CFDT appealed for police intervention 
to evacuate the strikers. The occupation and the strike thus came to an end on 5 January, 
while management organized the return to work under police supervision.
Despite the presence of union activists during that phase of the strike, the situation 
largely got out of hand and escaped union control. In that complex and confused 
situation, while the hostility between CGT and CFDT and mutual accusations were at 
their peak, the questions “who’s speaking?” and “in whose name?” were all the more 
difficult to answer; the dissidence was denounced by the CGT as a way of inciting 
immigrant workers to lead their own battle, even to “organize exclusively among 
themselves”.38 The evolutions of the dispute caused union positions −often unstable 
and short-lived rapprochements or distancing partly crystallised around those who 
spoke in the immigrants’ name− to shift. After their press conference, the latter acted 
33. For example, « Talbot, l’OPA de la CFDT », Le Matin, 20 December 1983.
34. « L’effet Talbot ou les raisons profondes d’un conflit », doc. cited
35. « Les douze heures de la violence », Libération, 6 January 1984.
36. Born in 1974, the PFN, while remaining in touch with the classical right wing, was for ca. ten years in competition 
with the National Front to occupy the extreme right-wing in French politics. After François Mitterrand was elected 
President, it led actions against the new government, particularly against the Communist Party, but then disappeared 
when the Front national began succeeding at the polls.
37. « Poursuivons le nettoyage », PFN tract distributed in Poissy on 5 January 1984, Archives interfédérales CFDT, 
deposit 10B34.
38. « La CGT à tous les travailleurs immigrés », CGT communique, 29 December 1983.
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independently from labour union structures, though the unions kept a close watch on 
them. By breaking away from the CGT during the last days of the strike, they seemed 
to be operating a rapprochement with the CFDT, who, disposing of a relatively small 
number of activists, hoped it had captured part of the factory’s immigrant population, 
and toward the end of January announced that “some 35 immigrant activists, ‘CGT 
dissidents’, have at their own behest met with the CFDT section and decided to join our 
union. Among them are the principal immigrant leaders, particularly the Moroccans”.39
Those hopes were to be thwarted in the end. After the fact, a CFDT activist felt that 
his union’s self-confidence was not justified at the time: the dissidents, or some of them, 
had wanted to “play the game on their own terms, […] they were completely lost, but 
they wanted to be spokesmen, they wanted to be important. But they were getting in 
too deep”.40 At the same time, the dissidents’ acts were not limited to the Poissy plant: 
they got in touch with other immigrant workers as well as with the young team of the 
“March for equality and against racism” that marched into Paris on 3 December 1983 
and with whom they organized a demonstration on 14 January.41 That rapprochement 
concluded a seemingly contradictory alliance between immigrant workers demanding 
voluntary return assistance and young descendants and heirs of immigrants demanding 
equal rights in France. Nevertheless, it shows that a general attempt was being made to 
express the immigrants’ point of view against the racism prevailing in France that was 
destroying French society, as shown, on the one hand, by the dismissal of unskilled 
labourers, and on the other, by racist crimes. That these workers should come forward 
with their own solutions, independently from labour union demands and from State 
injunctions, in particular by setting the amount of voluntary return assistance them-
selves, can be interpreted as their determination to decide their own destiny at least 
once in their life. But it can also pass for having internalised their inevitable exclusion 
from French society, signified by the radical violence of the last days of the strike.
For a few weeks, the CGT dissidents therefore found themselves in an unprec-
edented and uncertain militant position, acting of their own volition and at a distance 
from union instructions. Some were later to pursue union careers by joining Force 
ouvrière (FO). Though our sources do not contain actual details, a series of clues and 
testimonials allow imagining the various actors who made this evolution possible, 
among whom André Bergeron, Secretary of the FO Confederation,42 Talbot man-
agement43 or the Moroccan Embassy in France,44 which followed the conflicts in the 
39. « Circulaire de la FGM aux unions Métaux », 26 January 1984, Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 10B34.
40. Interview with Michel Beaugeois, skilled labourer and CFDT activist, March 2013.
41. « Beurs et immigrés de Talbot défilent coude à coude », Libération, 14 and 15 January 1984.
42. Interview with M’Hammed Mharam, February 2011. This former unskilled labourer and CGT delegate was one 
of the dissidents who later joined the FO union. Within the latter, but in a different company, he pursued a labour union 
career and ended up sitting on the Central European Committee of the firm that employed him.
43. Interviews with Nora Tréhel and Abdallah Fraiguy, respectively secretary and delegate of CGT-Poissy, February 
and May 2011.
44. « De la CGT à FO : la conversion des brebis égarées », Le Canard enchaîné, 7 March 1984.
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automobile industry involving Moroccan workers closely and which, since June 1982, 
had been putting pressure on its citizens to leave the CGT.45
That dissidence thus set off processes that escaped CGT activists when they could 
no longer organize the dispute. By pointing the finger at the union’s divisive strategies, 
the dissidents were expressing a real sense of waste compared to what had begun to be 
built up in the labour union since the early 1980s, as well as with regard to the symbolic 
capital accumulated by the CGT. On 3 January, Nora Tréhel, secretary of CGT-Talbot, 
while claiming the right to voluntary return assistance for those who wished it, also 
insisted on the division that prevailed in the movement:
“But we who continue to fight are divided. We fight… but no longer for the same 
reasons. It’s all for the highest bidder… because of the overkill. We keep piling it on. 
Sometimes it’s no to redundancies, sometimes it’s yes to redundancies in exchange 
for 20 million francs. What do we really want?”46
In the eyes of union activists, the “dissidents” were also showing a great lack 
of gratitude towards the CGT that had defended them for so many years.47 A feeling 
of betrayal penetrated CGT discourse in which it depicted itself as the victim of a 
conspiracy aiming to destabilise the only real existing opposition to the bosses and 
the CSL.48
The unions’ attitude vis-à-vis the demand for voluntary return assistance depended 
on the pertinence of the demand itself as much as on the way it was transmitted and 
by whom. None of the unions rejected it outright, but there were subtleties in their 
positions; above all, whereas the CFDT hoped to capture the dissidents thanks to its 
commitment to the strike and by contrast with the CGT’s prevarication, the latter, taken 
by surprise, denounced the dissidents. But in the end, the demand for return assistance 
was accepted, if not energetically defended, by both unions.
45. Hand-written note by the Association of Moroccan Workers in France (undated), February or March 1984, Archives 
du syndicat CGT PSA Poissy. Since the mid-1970s, Moroccan workers who emigrated to France and became active in 
the labour unions were arrested when they returned to Morocco, which was the particular case of a Talbot-Poissy worker 
in 1977 (interview with Driss Lafdil, October 2010). During and after the 1982 strikes, the Moroccan consulate inter-
vened via Friends of Moroccans in France or other associations, urging Moroccan workers in the automotive industry 
to stay out of the unions; it also summoned union members to warn them to stay clear of politics. In the case of Citroën, 
see the Note by Central Intelligence (Renseignements généraux), « Des recommandations de l’ambassade du Maroc 
à ses ressortissants employés à l’usine de Citroën-Aulnay », 30 November 1982, Archives CAC, deposit 19960134/8.
46. « Discours de Nora Tréhel, 3 janvier 1984, dans le bâtiment B3 de Talbot-Poissy », Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 
49J575.
47. See e.g. the reproach addressed to a dissident in an in-house communication: « Lettre du secrétariat du syndicat 
CGT-Talbot à Mohamed Chougrani », 26 January 1984, Archives du syndicat CGT PSA Poissy.
48. The CGT’s account of the dispute mentions “four CGT activists [who] in collaboration with the daily Libération 
organized a press conference to accuse the leaders of their union. Certain media intervene directly in the conflict. A real 
conspiracy against the CGT is fomenting” (« Peugeot ça suffit », confederal CGT 4-page tract, January or February 
1984, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568).
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Voluntary Return Assistance: a Union Demand?
In 1983, the principle of return assistance for immigrants was not new in France. 
Already in 1977, Lionel Stoléru, the minister in charge of manual and immigrant 
workers, had set up that sort of assistance; at the time it had been criticised and com-
batted by the associations supporting the immigrants, left-wing parties and the unions, 
the CGT calling it a “hoax”.49 As of 1981, it had been cancelled by the new govern-
ment.50 As to Talbot, it had formerly created “concerted actions of return assistance” 
(cancelled in 1982) that led to the departure of 629 workers.51 Nonetheless, “a certain 
number of (public and private) firms awarded more or less secret ‘departure bonuses’ 
that sometimes equated return assistance”,52 ranging from 60,000 to 200,000 francs.
Among the unions, positions differed. As of August 1983, Force Ouvrière felt that 
given the tremendous difficulty for migrant employees to find lasting employment, the 
State must help them satisfy their wish to return to their home countries in different 
ways, financial assistance included.53 During its Congress in November 1983, the CSL 
proposed creating a “departure booklet” for “all volunteers and especially the migrant 
unemployed”.54 For the CGT and the CFDT, the question of financial return assistance 
was not self-evident. The memory of the Stoléru measures was still fresh in their minds, 
and it was out of the question to condone a similar system. Nevertheless, little by little 
the demand was taken up by the unions, but in forms that revealed how uncomfortable 
the notion of return assistance made them feel. CGT-Talbot and the local Poissy union 
proposed that “if they volunteer, [workers] should say if they prefer training, a recon-
version or to return to their home country with substantial indemnities”.55
Though giving lip-service to rejecting “arbitrary redundancy”,56 henceforth the 
unions looked for individual solutions for those laid off and sought to respond to their 
personal aspirations, such as returning with a stipend.57 The CGT even claimed to have 
been the first to transmit that demand to the State authorities.58 However, the metal-
workers federation and confederation were more reserved and said that for the CGT, 
49. « Renvoi massif des immigrés : la CGT se dresse contre cette politique absurde, inique et dangereuse », Le Peuple, 
No 1018, 15-31 July 1977.
50. Decision of November 25, 1981.
51. « Note relative aux opérations concertées d’aide au retour, notamment avec l’entreprise Talbot (1980-1981) », 
Direction de la population et des migrations, 16 January 1984, Archives FNSP/WE/32. Aside from the redundancy 
bonuses that came to F10,000, immigrants who accepted to leave could choose between a bonus of F20,000 and a 
bonus of F16.000 with three months of training, or a nine-month training period.
52. « Note sur l’aide au retour des salariés licenciés de Talbot », Direction de la population et des migrations, 
22 December 1983, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
53. « Problème Talbot : constat, réflexion et revendications du syndicat Force ouvrière des métallurgistes de Poissy, 
section Peugeot Talbot Poissy et de l’union départementale Force ouvrière des Yvelines », 22 August 1983, Archives 
interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
54. Tract. Mensuel d’information de la CSL, No 62, February 1984.
55. Tract « UL CGT Poissy et syndicat CGT Talbot », 24 December 1983, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
56. Ibid.
57. « Déclaration CGT Talbot », 27 December 1983, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
58. « Peugeot ça suffit », doc. cited.
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return assistance was not a national demand.59 Though defending a different orientation 
in the dispute, the CFDT also felt concern over the demand for return assistance. One 
of its officials, active in organizing the strike, saw it as a direct result of the conflict:
“When the issue arose, it was really a reaction against the conflict itself […]; those 
who were involved didn’t see any way out, they saw we were going to fail and they 
reacted by thinking: they don’t want us anymore so the only solution is to leave, but we 
have to get what they owe us. […] But it was mainly anger. […] We were impacted, we 
were forced to see if we were going to swallow it or not. The question was asked inside 
the union because there were some CFDT activists who had already begun to accept 
it. We tried to navigate by saying that we weren’t really opposed if that was what 
people wanted but that the amounts demanded weren’t compatible with the firms’ 
possibilities, that it was an illusion and that in any case it wasn’t a union demand.”60
The CFDT also replaced the demand against the more general background of 
immigrants’ apprehension linked not only to the labour cuts in industry, the rise of 
violence and racism, but also to 
“the denunciation of Chiite fundamentalism by several government ministers when 
the conflicts broke out in the automobile sector in early 1983, [the] electoral victories 
of the extreme right on the theme of immigration, [which] reinforced the idea that 
cohabitation was practically impossible”.61
The union felt that such a demand risked isolating the workers at Talbot and compro-
mised any likelihood of unity in the struggle to reduce working time. In this sense, 
return assistance was not a demand of the labour unions, but it forced itself upon them 
and they rallied around it, though, in the case of the CFDT, stipulating that the returns 
should be voluntary and not proposed only to those made redundant. Also, the union 
stressed another aspect of voluntary return assistance, i.e. that the workers themselves 
should decide how much was due them:
“the workers have said what they mean by acquired rights; they are not willing to 
accept ‘haggling’ over insufficient amounts. In that sense, the balance of power 
needed to obtain satisfaction in the voluntary return demand is no small thing, for 
without a doubt the State will hesitate to go very far so as to avoid creating precedents 
that any worker –French or immigrant– would then be able to demand to leave a firm 
in case of downsizing.”62
The union was putting its finger on two important factors: who was to decide the 
amount letting a person leave the firm and France, and according to what criteria? If 
bonuses for leaving voluntarily concern all the employees in the industry, do they not 
represent a financial dead-end the government would prefer to avoid?
59. « Lettre d’André Sainjon à M. Mauroy », 8 January 1984, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
60. Interview in 2010 with Daniel Richter, engineer at Renault Flins, secretary of the CFDT Metal Workers Federation 
of the Seine and Oise Valley at the time of the dispute. In that capacity, he led the conflict along with CFDT activists 
from the Poissy plant.
61. « Les enjeux d’un conflit », CFDT-Talbot tract, 3 January 1984, Archives interfédérales CFDT, deposit 1B440.
62. Ibid.
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In both labour unions, formally refusing voluntary return assistance out of prin-
ciple thus went hand in hand with accepting it, for the sake of the demand per se, 
because of the impasse the dispute was in and because of the socio-economic context 
broadly speaking. Yet, return assistance was not unanimously approved by all migrant 
workers, including the card-carrying ones. Some said, 
“Their wishes must be taken into account. Talbot workers don’t want to become 
‘the unemployed of 81’ with 1,000 francs a month to survive on. If the left-wing 
government offers us a bonus, we’ll take it; we’re not going to get it later”.63
But the principle of differentiation and division surrounding return assistance con-
tinued to be problematic, perhaps even more so for the Moroccan delegates. With 
hindsight, some of them had been wary or even rejected the measure, saying they had 
encouraged those who volunteered for return assistance to withdraw their application.64 
One of the more senior CGT migrant delegates65 spoke up against return assistance, that 
he likened to haggling over his dignity. He was responding directly to the dissidents 
and the CFDT, questioning the meaning and the pertinence of so-called “immigrant” 
speech.66 Denouncing any temptation to create an immigrant union, and anything he 
perceived as culturalist, what he saw behind the notion of immigrant speech was the 
devaluation of his status as a worker: 
“When I hear some say over the CFDT microphone: ‘I speak as an immigrant’, it 
makes me jump out of my skin. What does that mean? That an immigrant doesn’t 
possess the intellectual qualities needed to be a true labour union official? When I 
speak, I speak as a full union member of the CGT and as all of what I am.”67 
After seventeen years in the factory, he felt he had earned the right to speak as 
a worker, while the demand for return assistance cut him down to the sole status of 
immigrant. He opposed it with the right to occupational training that would demon-
strate the capacity of immigrant workers to grow, whereas returning to their country 
would mark their eviction from the worker population.
Despite their different orientations in the face of the conflict and the redundancies, 
both unions therefore ended up by occupying relatively similar positions, consisting in 
accepting return assistance for those who volunteered; but volunteering in a context of 
crises and restructuring was ambiguous; it individualized the situations, while the fight 
for employment meant the response to dismissals could be collective. Volunteering 
and individual choice were also central in the reflexion and rhetoric of the French 
government.
63. « Quelques réflexions après la réunion du 7 février 1984 à la fédération CGT de la métallurgie », CGT National 
Secretariat for immigration, 15 February 1984, Archives Institut d’histoire sociale-CGT, deposit 105CFD32.
64. Interview in March 2013 with Yadih Baddouh, unskilled labourer and CGT delegate at the time of the dispute.
65. He joined the CGT in 1972.
66. The opposition between worker and immigrant speech during the strikes was noted as early as or even prior to 
the 1970s (PITTI, 2001).
67. Special tract printed by the CGT Metal Workers Federation, « Ma dignité n’est pas à vendre », interview with 
Abdallah Fraiguy, January 1984, Archives URIF-CGT, deposit 49J568.
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Partly a Way Out for the Government
Talbot was the first large conflict against redundancy that the government of the 
Union of the Left had to deal with. Taking off from the demand for voluntary return 
assistance, it had to respond to contradictory expectations at the same time. Creating 
a new system based on the Talbot case also raised new issues.
Acting in the Face of the Demand for Return Assistance
Methods to deal with mass redundancies were still rudimentary in 1983. The 
solution most frequently recommended was setting up a pre-retirement plan financed 
by the National Employment Fund (Fonds national pour l’emploi).68 Between 1974 and 
1983, over two million employees, not counting steel-workers, had taken advantage 
of that system (CORNILLEAU et al., 1990). Return assistance, which would later be 
renamed “reinsertion assistance”,69 allowed firms employing large numbers of migrant 
workers to dispose of a full range of such methods. Therefore, when some Talbot 
workers applied for reinsertion assistance, the government jumped on the chance to 
propose new schemes. On 23 December, to get a better grasp of their grievances, the 
Ministry in charge of the family, population and migrant workers summoned those who 
had organized the press conference. The fear of being laid off in the future was topmost; 
it was therefore urgent to find individual solutions fast, before the situation worsened 
and while those workers were still of an age that a second professional career could 
still be imagined, for “the time that passes diminishes the chances of reintegrating in 
their own country”.70 The government saw this as “a new factor that it would be best 
to put to good use” by responding to a demand, “however short-lived”, and also by 
showing the countries of origin that “the demand does not emanate from France alone, 
it also comes from their own emigrants”.71 It was then necessary to “draw up concrete 
projects” based on hazy plans, “inciting the persons concerned to make them known, 
especially to their own governments”.72
Return assistance was conceived and presented as an element of the negotiation, 
with regard to the home countries first of all, who were not overly pleased to see 
their citizens return, but also with regard to the labour unions and the firm, to whom 
a less brutal solution than outright dismissals or hypothetical reclassifications could 
be proposed. The government considered setting up a new system based on the Talbot 
case; what the firm would offer its employees was of paramount importance, for it 
68. Interview with René Cessieux.
69. Concerning the semantic and political stakes involved in the expressions “return assistance” and “reinsertion assis-
tance” in the government’s thinking, see the interview with Georgina Dufoix, Le Monde, 19 January 1984.
70. Note from Élizabeth Lion to Georgina Dufoix, Minister of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, 6 January 1984, 
Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes, 558PO1/322.
71. Confidential communication by Alain Gillette, cabinet director at the Secretary of State in charge of the Family, 
the Population and Immigrant Workers, 6 January 1984, archives FNSP/WE/32.
72.  Note from Élizabeth Lion to Georgina Dufoix, doc. cited.
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would establish the minimum that could be granted to any migrant worker being laid 
off in the future.73 The fate of the fired Talbot personnel was not seen as an isolated 
case but as a precedent on which a system permitting to imagine the departure of 
20,000 immigrants from French industry could be built. Exchanges inside the gov-
ernment also concerned the publicity and communications that should accompany the 
new measures. Where should reinsertion assistance figure? Was it part of immigration 
policy or part of the industrial politics of employment? How should it be included in the 
directives concerning immigration that had been redefined in August 1983 in a more 
restrictive sense? How could the difference with the Stoléru return assistance system 
be highlighted? Also, reinsertion assistance had to satisfy contradictory expectations, 
those of the home countries as well as those of the “immigrant communities” who 
wanted a reinsertion policy but rejected any system that recalled “the ‘pack your bags, 
Mohamed!’ slogan”.74 And too, the expectations of French public opinion, perceived 
a priori as hostile to immigrants, if not xenophobic, had to be considered. The gov-
ernment did not intend to offer reinsertion assistance as directly in line with industrial 
reform; it wanted at all costs to avoid aggravating the sense of rejection and having it 
seen as a “good-riddance return” measure.75 On the contrary, presenting the measure at 
the same time as the ten-year residence permit was created pointed to a well-balanced 
policy capable of satisfying the “partly contradictiory” expectations of fringe sections 
of both French and immigrant public opinion.76
The First Steps of a New System of Reinsertion Assistance
Since the beginning of 1983, the government felt that its immigration policy was 
one of its least well understood policies (WEIL, 1995) and, within the framework of 
North-South cooperation, had implemented a new orientation that included a section 
on reinsertion in the native country.77 An inter-ministerial team presided by former 
ambassador Paul-Marc Henry, who stressed “the flexible and pioneering character of 
the solutions to be invented”78 while acknowledging the failure of previous procedures 
and the perplexity of public authorities as to what needed to be done, was set up. The 
objectives put forward concerning cooperation with the native countries and supposed 
to underscore the difference with the measures adopted by the previous government, 
73.  Confidential communication by Alain Gillette, doc. cited.
74.  Secretary of State in charge of the Family, the Population and Immigrant Workers, 13 January 1984, Archives 
FNSP/WE/32. « Mohamed prends ta valise » (“pack your bags, Mohamed”) refers to the return assistance system set 
up by Lionel Stoléru, that its critics often assimilated to a disguised expulsion.
75. Note by René Cessieux, technical consultant to the Prime Minister, and Gilles Johanet, in charge of a mission for 
the Prime Minister, sent to Alain Gillette, 13 February 1984, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
76. Note by Gilles Johannet, in charge of a mission for the Prime Minister, 26 March 1984, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
77. « Lutte contre l’immigration illégale et insertion des populations immigrées », communication by Madame Georgina 
Dufoix to the Board of Ministers, 31 August 1983, Archives FNSP/WE/17.
78. Minutes of the first meeting of the permanent inter-ministerial coordination committee for reinsertion, 10 November 
1983, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
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hit up against the native countries’ reticence to welcome their citizens back.79 The 
lay-offs at Talbot speeded up a process as yet still in its early stages and more precise 
propositions were exchanged during the dispute. Ministry advisors came forth with 
the general principles supposed to govern return assistance: it should be offered to 
volunteers who had been fired from their company and aim as much as possible to 
reinsert them professionally thanks to a cooperation that would require bilateral agree-
ments and proscribe any unilateral, public decision.80
As the government’s plans became more clear-cut, new questions arose which 
were just so many symptoms of the problems underlying the political conception of the 
new system. What would be the counterpart of the assistance granted by the State? For 
while acting in favor of migrant workers’ reinsertion, the point was also to reduce their 
presence on French soil. To the French authorities, granting residence and work permits 
seemed the “‘logical’ counterpart to granting specific, financial, public assistance”.81 
But it required either bilateral agreements, or a law; the former allowed enlisting the 
cooperation of the home countries, but eventual vetoes on their part was a liability, not 
to mention the fact the process would probably be very slow. A law would be faster, but 
it would not permit targeting specific nationalities and would spark a public debate that 
the government preferred to avoid. The other possibility was to create a “right to renege 
on the return”, acknowledging the possibility that reinsertion might fail and therefore 
allow immigrant workers to keep their residence and work permits when leaving the 
firm and France. It emphasized the difference with respect to the “good-riddance 
return” formula of the Stoléru period and made the measure “politically acceptable 
in the eyes of the Left and credible in the eyes of the migrants”.82 Compared to the 
measures decided by the previous government, this one should therefore not offend 
anti-racist French Left-wingers, but remain sufficiently tempting in the eyes of those 
primarily concerned. Who was reinsertion assistance intended for? Though the project 
was first and foremost a response to the fate of those laid off at Talbot, enlarging its 
scope was also meant to facilitate reforms in other companies where foreigners were 
employed. Should it then be granted exclusively to those made redundant or made 
available to all legal foreign workers who applied? This would reinforce the voluntary 
nature of assistance, keep it at arm’s length from the “good-riddance return” slogan 
and allow keeping a cool head, contrary to the Talbot case; however, its cost as well 
as the reactions of French public opinion hardly encouraged the government to take 
that way out. What would the fate of the immigrants’ beneficiaries be? The aim was 
to make sure that immigrants made redundant would leave and not return; yet, the 
fate of their spouses and children was just as important, because if they remained in 
France, the immigrant having taken advantage of return assistance might once again 
79. Minutes of the first meeting…, doc. cited.
80. “Note confidentielle du directeur de cabinet du secrétariat d’État chargé de la Famille, de la Population et des 
Travailleurs immigrés”, 26 December 1983, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
81. Ibid.
82. « Note sur l’aide au retour  » by Gilles Johannet, in charge of a mission for the Prime Minister, 3 February 1984, 
Archives FNSP/WE/32.
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demand to come back pretexting family reunification. Should “constraint or simply 
encouragement”83 be chosen by increasing the amount of assistance? In the end, in 
1983, after the first exchanges with the governments of the native countries, bilateral 
agreements were considered unavoidable but they turned out to be particularly prickly. 
Despite misgivings, the French government found itself obliged to lay down its own 
rules, considering that a unilateral basis could be a first step “on the way to bilateral 
agreements”.84
Finally, a two-pronged solution was decided upon: they adopted a temporary 
system, exclusively aimed at Talbot’s laid-off employees, which would eventually 
become the basis for downsizing in the case that migrant workers were involved. 
The “Talbot system” was built around a stipendium of 20,000 francs donated by the 
company, F20,000 by the Assedic [unemployment benefit fund], and, on condition they 
give up their residence and work permits, between F17,000 to F20,000 taken from the 
budget devoted to the training of Talbot laid-off personnel.85 Among the latter, during 
the first phase, a minority −six months after the redundancies had been announced− only 
202 of those made redundant chose to apply for reinsertion assistance.86 Later on, their 
number increased, much to the surprise of many employees.87 The overall system was 
defined as follows:88 the laid-off employee must possess residence and work permits, 
must have been made redundant less than six months before and employed by a firm on 
contract with the National Immigration Bureau (Office national d’immigration – ONI). 
He/she must not be a citizen or member of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
or of a country in the process of becoming one, and he/she must leave France with his/
her spouse. Lastly, he/she must have a project for professional reinsertion approved by 
the ONI. The assistance itself consisted in a flat sum of F20,000 donated by the State, 
along with help for moving, a payment by the Assedic, and a stipendium from the firm 
at least equal to that of the State. On the average, a beneficiary received approximately 
F90,000.89 Over the 1980s, the system evolved, especially so as to include long-term 
unemployed, 1985 being the peak for returns, with the departure of 32,898 persons.
•
The 1983-1984 strike must be seen as part of the cycle of crisis that hit the auto-
mobile industry in 1981 and ended mid-1984 with the redundancies announced by 
83. « Note sur l’aide au retour  », doc. cited.
84. Note by Élizabeth Lion à Georgina Dufoix, 29 février 1984, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
85. « Relevé de décisions de la réunion interministérielle du 2 janvier 1984 », Archives FNSP/WE/32.
86. « Liste des personnels licenciés par Talbot début 1984 ayant déposé un prédossier de réinsertion », 19 June 1984, 
CAC, deposit 19940732/2.
87. Jean-Pierre Noual, secretary of CFDT-Talbot, admitted having been wrong about return assistance, observing that 
“it worked”. Cf. « Le vertigineux succès de l’aide au retour », Le Matin, 25 June 1985.
88. Decree of 27 April 1984 and Law of 17 July 1984.
89. Note from Christian Nguyen, Technical advisor at the Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, to 
Charles-Henri Filippi, Director of the Georgina Dufoix cabinet, 20 August 1984, Archives FNSP/WE/32.
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Citroën. There were distinct phases. Until the beginning of 1983, the conflict was 
aggressive, workers demanded rises in salary, better working conditions, the freedom 
to organize and the respect of their dignity. In the Citroën and Talbot plants, the 1982 
strikes thus seemed to be making an inroad into French social life and union partici-
pation. Yet, a year and a half later, part of the strikers, of immigrant origin, applied for 
assistance to leave their firm and France. Such a reversal interrogates the conditions 
prevailing during the previous conflict at Talbot, where particular circumstances had 
made a victorious strike possible. However, as soon as maintaining the jobs looked 
hopeless, workers turned to return assistance. The demand for maintaining jobs 
alternated, collided, even competed with demands for return assistance, but it was 
only when the fight for employment petered out that the demand for return assis-
tance gained momentum and led to all the actors –union activists, unskilled migrant 
labourers, management, and the French government– having to redefine where they 
stood. Representing a stake in the battle or a divisive element for some union activists, 
the demand for return assistance nevertheless ended up creating a form of consensus 
backed by the notions of individual choice and volunteering. Nevertheless, it was an 
ambiguous sort of consensus, because it raised the question whether it was legitimate 
for migrant workers to be in France, while simultaneously those for whom immigration 
represented a problem wanted to send them back to their home countries.90 In the 
context of the early 1980s, the notion of choice imperfectly covered up the fact that 
the return was part of the State’s conception, for whom the legitimacy of immigrants’ 
presence in France depended on their status as workers (SAYAD, 2006). The immigrants 
themselves, or at least some of them −and the labour unions, when they were no longer 
able to defend employment− shared that point of view, of which the return to the home 
country was a basic component.
Besides, while reinsertion assistance was aimed at a particular segment of the 
employee population, it was also one of the many measures by which the State could 
socialise the cost of industrial reform. Since the mid-1970s, and progressively more as 
the crisis deepened, the successive governments had chosen to follow the same route, 
inciting firms to undertake economic redundancies, especially as withdrawing certain 
categories of workers from activity had been facilitated (COLIN et al., 1981). Between 
1973 and 1988, the costs of the employment policy increased proportionally, from 0.9% 
to 3.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP)91 (CORNILLEAU et al., 1990). Throughout 
the 1980s and 90s, age considerations were applied particularly in the automobile 
sector to whittle down the permanent workforce; measures regarding migrant workers 
obeyed the same logics, because they permitted avoiding some outright dismissals 
while at the same time reducing the number of stable jobs.
Other aspects that impacted every echelon from the workshops to the highest 
spheres of the State would require further study in order to come to terms with all the 
dimensions of the conflict. Each domain −the politics, the labour unions, the industry, 
90. « Le retour, une arme à double tranchant », interview with Ahsene Zehraoui, Libération, 14 and 15 January 1984.
91. Employment costs here cover unemployment benefits, pre-retirement and occupational training for working adults.
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etc.− would deserve scrutiny on different levels. For instance, the way immigrant union 
delegates operated in the workshops was clearly at odds with the practices of their 
union leaders; but given their respective social positions, what sort of coherence can 
exist between a striker and a negotiator? The same question goes for company execu-
tives, torn between the directors of the group on one side and the plant managers facing 
the dispute in the field on the other. During the tense period when labour disputes chal-
lenged ongoing political changes and the balance of power, local politics might also 
be analysed, particularly in Poissy where, in 1983, the Communist mayor, formerly 
a CGT secretary at the automobile factory, and husband of the acting secretary, was 
beaten by a representative of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), formerly 
a member of the CSL. Without going into the strict causality of the factors at play in 
the various domains, one may wonder about their permeable nature and how the actors 
were affected by it.
Finally, the conflict cannot be correctly understood if one does not take the political 
context into account. The first electoral victories of the French National Front and the 
1983 campaign for the Municipal elections testified to the powerful rise of xenophobia 
among voters; that factor contributed to the government’s new policies on immigration, 
but it also modified unskilled migrant labourers’ perception of the future. It is therefore 
indispensable to consider employees’ situations in a broader context than the economic 
reality of the firms, in order to appreciate the extent to which that context moulded 
their perception of the stakes and the opportunities.
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